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ABS Health Survey, 2013 
84% of Australians visit the GP 
Australian primary health care  
 Universal coverage through Medicare 
• Commonwealth funded to scheduled fee 
 Medicare also covers diagnostics, drugs 
 Strong gate keeping 
 Free choice of provider 
 Fee for service based 
 Private practice, ability to set fees 
 82% encounters are bulkbilled 
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What is already known … 
 Payment systems provide incentives 
 Main effects of major payment methods 
established 
 No one payment mechanism achieves 
the right balance. 
 Target performance with financial 
incentives 
 Move to blend payment systems  
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Pay for performance in primary care 
 Better Practice Program introduced 1996 
 Became Practice Incentives Program 1998 
• 11 different incentives 
 Service Incentives Program 
• Diabetes, asthma, cervical screening 
 Bulk billing incentives 
 Around 5% total GP income 
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 The Practice Incentives Program (PIP) 
PIP participation  Quarter ending June 2011 
PIP incentive No of practices % 
Quality prescribing 
761 16% 
Diabetes sign-on 4,611 96% 
Diabetes outcomes 2,157 47% 
Cervical screening sign-on 4,634 97% 
Cervical screening outcomes 3,159 68% 
Asthma sign-on 4,521 95% 
Indigenous health sign-on 217 5% 
Indigenous health patient registration 
913 19% 
Indigenous health outcomes 85 2% 
eHealth 4,189 88% 
After hours  4,469 93% 
 Teaching  951 20% 
Total practice participation = 68% (n=4,781) 
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Service Incentive Payments 
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Asthma SIP
Cervical Screening SIP
Diabetes SIP
Turnover in participation 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
% receiving payments 47.7 43.8 44.0 43.8 
% drop outs 38.4 
 
34.5 
 
34.7 
Who uses incentives?  
• Location is very important 
• GPs in an outer (inner) regional location are on average around 
35% (20%) more likely to use grants than those in cities  
• GPs working in large practices are more likely to use government 
grants 
• Working in a practice where there are more than 10 GPs 
implies, on average, a 10% higher likelihood of using grants 
• Having more than 10 administrative staff in the practice was 
associated with a 10% higher likelihood of using grants in 2008 
and a 27% higher likelihood in 2011 
 
Conclusions 
 Rural GPs target with more incentives 
 Size may reflect administrative burden 
 High turnover within scheme is not part 
of incentive design 
• Blunting effect of small incentive 
• Changing business conditions 
Bulk billing incentives 
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  Children and  
Concession Cardholders 
Non-cardholders 
Metropolitan  
areas 
Rural, Remote & 
outer areas 
Metropolitan 
areas 
Rural, Remote & 
outer areas 
Bulk-Billing 
Incentive 
(February 2004) 
$5 additional 
reimbursement to 
GP if GP ‘bulk-bills’  
$7.50 additional 
reimbursement to 
GP if GP ‘bulk-bills’ 
No change No change 
Increase in 
Medicare Rebate 
(January 2005) 
 
Increase reimbursement rate of GP services from 85% to 100% 
Data 
 Australian Longitudinal Study of Women’s Health  
 Medicare Australia data 
• Individual level by quarter between 2003Q1 & 2005Q4 
• GP: Services and Out of Pocket costs 
 Who gets bulkbilled? Who is charged? At what levels? 
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 The Strengthening Medicare reforms reduced OOP costs on 
average for women  
 Concession cardholders and people in remote areas had 
greater reductions on average OOP  
 OOP costs increased for most non-cardholders following the 
first policy. This suggests greater price discrimination 
among GPs after the reform by charging lower fees to 
concession cardholders and higher fees to non-cardholders 
 The magnitude of the OOP cost reduction was relatively 
small compared to the government pay out 
 
Medical homes 
 Regular source of care 
 Continuity and comprehensive care 
 Easy access 
 Medical records available 
Supported by 
 Capitation 
 Some form of risk sharing 
 Targeted incentives 
The REFinE Survey 
 patient perceptions of GP practice 
structure, payment methods & patients’ 
experience of using health care services 
 Used online panel – more chronic 
disease, older, more urban, less 
insurance  
 2,477 respondents provided completed 
surveys for analysis 
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Survey Experience:  Stated Loyalty 
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Practice Loyalty by Subgroup 
20 
Conclusion 
 High degree of patient loyalty to practices 
• Linked to being older, retired, living in larger outer 
urban cities, presence of chronic health issues 
• Where choice of GP, or availability of multiple GPs 
is important. 
 Patients who want bulk-billing more likely to 
be multiple practice users. 
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Availability of care 
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Availability of care (cont) 
 About a third (n=813) reported needing 
GP visit but did not (last 12 mths).  
• 43% too busy with work/personal/family 
• 34% appointment not available when 
required. 
 81% (n=2031) reported no visits to an ED 
 23% (of 466) visited ED as GP substitute 
• 56% = 1 visit, 37% 2-3, 6% 4-11 visits 
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The consultation (cont) 
 Very few reported issues with quality or 
cost of care. Less than 3% reported: 
• medical records or test results not available 
• medication prescribed/test(s) 
ordered/referral made that was either too 
costly/not taken up 
• GP did not perform a physical examination 
even though patient believed it was needed. 
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The consultation (cont) 
 A positive process: almost 99% reported: 
• GP spent sufficient time on the consultation 
• knew their medical history 
• listened to their concerns and needs 
• explained the condition and proposed 
treatment in an understandable way 
• involved them in any decision making.  
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Reason for Multiple Use 
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Factors which lead to ED use 
 People are more likely to visit  
• With more chronic conditions 
• With more GP visits 
 And less likely to visit 
• With no need of out of hours care 
• With high quality GP care 
 And makes no difference 
• If out of hours care is difficult 
Services available compared to what would 
be used if available 
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Conclusions 
 Australian patients are loyal 
 They find care readily available and high quality 
 They tend to stick with services they know 
 They seek high quality care 
 They would like more one stop care 
 Lack of access/availability drives multiple use 
 Cost is a factor but not the most important 
 High quality care seems to reduce ED use 
What have we learnt 
 Financial incentives 
• One-off actions are easy 
• Administrative burden matters 
• Can have unintended effects 
• Are expensive if they reward existing behaviour 
• Impact depends on non-financial incentives too 
• Effectiveness can change over time 
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More information: www.refinephc.org.au 
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